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 INTRODUCTION 
 Over the past 50 years, investors in US listed 
companies have experienced pronounced waves 
of materially unreliable fi nancial reporting. As 
each wave of malfeasance and negligence rose 
to prominence and attracted political and regu-
latory attention, new commissions and hearings 
to study the problem were convened. Reports 
were issued and, in some cases, subject to the 
political pressures of the day, steps were taken 
to try and improve the reliability of fi nancial 
reporting. 
 Starting in the 1970s, after a wave of signifi -
cant unreliable fi nancial disclosures, the Cohen 
Commission studied the problem of fraudulent 
fi nancial reporting and concluded that a key 
element of the solution should be manage-
ment and auditor assessment of, and reports 
on, something they termed  ‘ control effective-
ness ’ . This conclusion was for all intents and 
purposes ignored at the time by Congress and 
the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC). In 
the 1980s, following another wave of massively 
unreliable fi nancial statements precipitated 
by the savings and loan crisis, the Treadway 
Commission explored the problem again and 
reached similar conclusions. 
 Twenty-four years after the Cohen Commis-
sion reported, and 15 years after Treadway, fol-
lowing what has been referred to as the  ‘ perfect 
storm ’ of fraud and unreliable fi nancial reporting 
led by Enron and WorldCom, US Congress 
dredged up the archives of the Cohen and 
Treadway Commissions and, in record time, 
enacted the  Sarbanes – Oxley Act of 2002 . This 
now infamous piece of legislation mandated for 
the fi rst time CEO and CFO reporting on con-
trol effectiveness with parallel external auditor 
opinions  – Section 404(a) and (b). Evidence 
suggests that the relatively short paragraphs that 
comprise Section 404 may well hold the world 
record as the single most expensive regulatory 
imposition in the history of securities regulation 
( FEI, 2007 ;  US Chamber of Commerce, 2007 ; 
 Alexander  et al , 2010 ). 
 The recent global fi nancial crisis, unequiv-
ocally the most damaging wave of unreliable 
fi nancial reporting in world history, materialized 
more than fi ve years after the hugely expensive 
Sarbanes – Oxley legislation was enacted. With 
the benefi t of time, it has become clear that 
the fi nancial statements of some of the world ’ s 
largest fi nancial institutions were massively 
wrong leading up to the eventual global col-
lapse, not by billions this time but by trillions 
of dollars. 
 Once the 2008 global crisis materialized, more 
Commissions and hearings were convened in 
the United States and in other countries around 
the globe to try and identify root causes of the 
unprecedented US corporate governance break-
down. The G-20 leaders requested the Inter-
national Accounting Standards Board (IASB) 
and the Financial Accounting Standards Board 
(FASB) to evaluate and report on what went 
wrong in the area of accounting and auditing 
standards. The result was the creation of the 
 Financial Crisis Advisory Group ( ‘ FCAG ’ ). The 
FCAG concluded,  ‘ Accounting was not a root 
cause of the fi nancial crisis, but it has an impor-
tant role to play in its resolution ’ (2009). 
 In the United Kingdom, the House of Lords 
Economic Affairs Committee was charged with 
studying what caused the great fi nancial crisis 
of 2008. This UK Committee has played a lead 
role calling the accounting and auditing profes-
sions to account for their defi ciencies (2011, 
para.138 – 144). On 6 April 2011,  Lynn Turner , 
a past SEC Chief Accountant and a witness at 
the US Senate Banking, Housing and Urban 
Affairs Committee hearings, also examined the 
role of the accounting and auditing professions, 
and called for an in-depth analysis of the role 
of auditors in the crisis. 
 In the wake of the global fi nancial crisis, infl u-
ential commissions were convened, inclu ding the 
powerful  Senior Supervisors Group ( ‘ SSG ’ ) and 
the National Association of Corporate Directors 
( ‘ NACD ’ ) Blue Ribbon Commission, to study 
the root causes of the problem. These groups, 
among others, have converged on the belief that 
defi cient risk management and defi cient board-
level risk oversight are two of the root causes of 
the 2008 global fi nancial crisis. 
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 Make no mistake  – the root problems 
identifi ed by these groups of defi cient risk 
management and defi cient risk oversight 
directly impacted the reliability of the fi nan-
cial statements of the institutions at the center 
of this storm in the period leading up to 
the global crisis. The vast majority of the 
most leveraged companies at the heart of the 
crisis, including Lehman Brothers, AIG, Bear 
Stearns, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, Bank of 
America and others, were all deemed in the 
period leading up to the global crisis by their 
CEOs, CFOs and external audit fi rms in their 
SOX certifi cations to have  ‘ effective ’ systems 
of internal control over fi nancial reporting 
in accordance with the dated and obsolete 
( Leech, 2008 ) 1992 COSO Internal Control 
Integrated Framework  – the primary assess-
ment framework used by US listed companies 
as required by the SEC. Simply stated  – There 
was no warning for investers. None of the 
organizations at the root of the global crisis, 
including those that met their demise as 
a result of stupendously bad investment 
decisions, reported in the period leading up 
to the global crisis that they had any mate-
rial control defi ciencies when referenced 
against the 1992 COSO internal control 
framework. 
 In light of these developments and conclu-
sions, key questions investors and regulators all 
over the world should be asking are: 
 1.  Why did so many major fi nancial institu-
tions at the heart of the global crisis produce 
massively wrong SOX 404 control effec-
tiveness opinions and fi nancial statements in 
the period leading up to the global crisis? 
Why did the auditing profession sign-off 
on these opinions? Particularly when major 
Commissions studying these events have 
concluded that these organizations had seri-
ously defi cient risk management and risk 
oversight, and  ‘ risk management ’ is one of 
the fi ve COSO internal control integrated 
framework categories companies are required 
to assess under SOX.  
 2.  Why have major commissions asked to study 
the root causes of the global crisis, including 
the IASB and the FASB, not called for SOX 
404 reforms? 
 3.  What needs to change to increase the reli-
ability of fi nancial statements during periods 
of, in the famous and ironic words of  Alan 
Greenspan , past Chair of the US Reserve 
Bank,  ‘ irrational exuberance ’ (1996) to 
reduce the chances of another global fi nan-
cial crisis? 
 What is absolutely clear is that SOX 404, a 
massively expensive regime that applied to the 
majority of fi nancial institutions at the heart 
of the 2008 global crisis; a regime in place 
for over fi ve of the years leading up to the 
2008 global economic crisis; a regime heavily 
focused on low-level control identifi cation and 
control testing; a regime that produced clean 
external auditor opinions linked to some of 
the largest corporate asset misstatements in US 
history; a regime that still requires the use of 
the 1992 COSO Internal Control Integrated 
Framework, an obsolete control assessment 
framework that is now almost 20 years old; 
completely missed the storm bearing down on 
some of the world ’ s largest fi nancial institutions 
and investors around the world. 
 Without signifi cant legislative and regula-
tory change, there is little certainty that the 
current massively expensive control-centric 
SOX 404 assessment regime will fare any 
better next time at detecting the next wave 
of unreliable reporting. This article proposes 
a bold, yet incredibly simple, step to reduce 
the likelihood of yet another wave of unreli-
able fi nancial reporting  – a short amendment 
by US Congress to the wording of Section 
404 of the Sarbanes – Oxley Act of 2002 to 
focus the attention of senior mana gement and 
external auditors on risk management effec-
tiveness. This legislative amendment would 
need to be accompanied by changes to SEC 
and Public Company Accounting Oversight 
Board (PCAOB) implementation rules to 
require assessments done by CEOs and CFOs 
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(SOX 404(a)), and external auditors (SOX 
404(b)), to focus on eva luating and reporting 
on the effectiveness of the risk management 
processes to reliably identify, assess and manage 
signifi cant risks to the goal of materially reli-
able fi nancial reporting account balances and 
note disclosures. 
 This article explores at a high level: 
 1.  Four distinct waves of unreliable fi nancial 
reporting in the United States, including 
the period leading up to the 2008 global 
fi nancial crisis; 
 2.  The US legal and regulatory response as 
each wave of signifi cant unreliable reporting 
emerged, focusing on the link commissions 
and regulators made at the time between a 
company ’ s control environment and reliable 
fi nancial reporting; 
 3.  The defi ciencies of the massively expensive 
 ‘ control-centric ’ assessment approach to 
SOX 404, an approach that the majority 
of fi nancial institutions at the root of the 
global crisis and their auditors are currently 
forced by current rules to use by US Con-
gress, the SEC and PCAOB; 
 4.  What a true  ‘ risk-centric ’ SOX assessment 
approach would look like, and why a risk-
centric approach has a far greater likelihood 
of detecting and treating risks with the 
potential to destabilize national and global 
economies at a substantially lower cost than 
the current SOX 404 regime; 
 5.  Why a SOX 404 amendment to require 
reports on effectiveness of risk management 
processes, not control effectiveness, is neces-
sary to align fi nancial reporting approaches 
with recent best practices and regulatory 
reforms requiring enhanced board and senior 
management risk oversight; 
 6.  Steps the US government, the SEC, the 
PCAOB and security regulators around 
the world should take to reduce the risk 
of yet another wave of unreliable fi nancial 
reporting, and yet another crisis of investor 
confi dence and crippling impacts on world 
economies. 
 UNRELIABLE FINANCIAL 
REPORTING  – WAVE #1  – 
THE 1970S  – LEAVE IT TO 
THE AICPA TO FIX 
 Paul Clikeman , in his thought-provoking book, 
 Called to Account: Fourteen Financial Frauds that 
Shaped the American Accounting Profession sum-
marizes events in the 1960s and 1970s: 
 In the late 1960s and early 1970s, a series 
of accounting scandals including Conti-
nental Vending, Four Seasons Nursing 
Home, US Financial, Yale Express, 
Giant Department Stores, and National 
Student Marketing, raised questions about 
whether auditors were doing enough to 
fi ght fi nancial crime. 
 Equity Funding, in 1973, cast new 
doubt on the nation ’ s fi nancial reporting 
system.  ‘ … a lot of people decided that 
if the auditing system didn ’ t catch the 
Equity Funding Fraud, then the system 
was a bad one, ’ the Wall Street Journal 
reported,  ‘ … after Equity Funding, 
it ’ s hard for accountants to argue that 
a massive swindle, with thousands of 
victims is beyond the scope of a routine 
audit. ’ (2009, p. 127) 
 In response to the outcry, the American Insti-
tute of Certifi ed Public Accountants ( ‘ AICPA ’ ) 
funded  The Commission on Auditor ’ s Responsibili-
ties , better known as the Cohen Commission. 
The Commission task was to: 
 Develop conclusions and recommenda-
tions regarding the appropriate respon-
sibilities of independent auditors. It should 
consider whether a gap may exist between 
what the public expects and needs and 
what auditors can and should reasonably 
expect to accomplish. If such a gap does 
exist, it needs to be explored to deter-
mine how the disparity can be resolved. 
(1978, p. xi) 
 A key element of the study was to determine 
why an alarming number of external auditor 
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opinions on public company fi nancial state-
ments were subsequently proven wrong. A 
key conclusion of the Commission in light of 
the current global fi nancial crisis more than 30 
years later was: 
 The public accounting profession has 
failed to react and evolve rapidly enough 
to keep pace with the speed of change 
in the American business environment. 
That failure in the development of 
accounting principles was noted by the 
Study Group on the Establishment of 
Accounting Principles (the Wheat study 
group), whose report led the formation 
of the Financial Accounting Standards 
Board. We believe this Commission ’ s 
report demonstrates a similar failure 
of the development of the accounting 
function. Therefore many of the recom-
mendations in this report are designed 
to speed the pace of change in the 
profession and to make it more recep-
tive to the forces of change in the future. 
(1978, p. xii) 
 The report goes on to state: 
 Users expect the auditor to be concerned 
with the possibility of both fraud and 
illegal behaviour by management. In all 
of these areas, users expect more than 
they believe they are receiving. (1978, 
p. xvii) 
 To reduce the incidence of auditor opinion 
failure, an important conclusion of the Com-
mission noted: 
 A major step in implementing the 
Commission ’ s proposed evolution, which 
should be adopted as soon as possible, 
would require the auditor to expand his 
study and evaluation of the controls over 
the accounting system to form a conclu-
sion on the functioning of the internal 
accounting control system. If the auditor 
fi nds material weaknesses in the internal 
accounting control system, and those 
weaknesses are not corrected, material 
defi ciencies may occur in the prepara-
tion of accounting information or in the 
control of the corporation ’ s assets. (1978, 
p. xxiii) 
 The standard of professional skill and care 
should be amplifi ed to require a study and 
evaluation of controls that have a signifi -
cant bearing on the prevention and detec-
tion of fraud. The auditor should report 
material weaknesses to the proper level 
of management, including, if appropriate, 
the audit committee or the full board of 
directors, and should follow-up to deter-
mine whether the weaknesses have been 
eliminated. (pp. 39 – 40). Methods and 
procedures should be adopted for public 
accounting fi rms to exchange informa-
tion on developments in perpetration 
and detection of fraud. The  AICPA 
should establish means for regular dissem-
ination of that type of information. (1978, 
p. xx) 
 The Commission was clearly not shy or con-
fl icted in offering specifi c and radical changes 
to the  status quo . It called for a formal report 
from management on control: 
 The report by management should present 
management ’ s assessment of the compa-
ny ’ s accounting system and controls over 
it, including a description of the inherent 
limitations of control systems and a 
description of the company ’ s response 
to material weaknesses identifi ed by the 
company ’ s independent auditor. It should 
describe the work of the company ’ s audit 
committee and its internal auditors. The 
fi rst report by management following 
a change in independent auditors should 
disclose the change in a manner similar 
to that now required in SEC Form 8-K. 
The report by management should avoid 
purely subjective judgments designed to 
impress users with the quality of manage-
ment. (1978, p. xxiv) 
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 Legal / regulatory response 
 These radical 1977 recommendations of the 
Cohen Commission were, for all intents and 
purposes, ignored by both US regulators 
and the auditing profession. The Chairman 
of the landmark Cohen Commission, Manuel 
F. Cohen, died before the Commission ’ s report 
was released. 
 The government of the day and the SEC 
were largely content to leave corrective action 
in the hands of the AICPA. The AICPA ’ s 
response at the time was to issue Statements 
on Auditing Standards ( ‘ SAS ’ ) No. 16, The 
Independent Auditor ’ s Responsibility for the 
Detection of Errors and Irregularities. SAS 
16 contained sweeping limitations on what 
could be expected of auditors when fraud 
was involved. No concrete steps were imple-
mented to require auditors to assess the com-
pany ’ s system of controls, including specifi c 
attention to controls to prevent material fraud, 
and formally report on their effectiveness. No 
effort or resources were expended to formally 
study and identify the root causes of material 
accounting misstatements. 
 UNRELIABLE FINANCIAL 
REPORTING  – WAVE #2  – THE 
SEC IGNORES TREADWAY 
RECOMMENDATIONS BECAUSE 
OF COST CONCERNS 
 The 1980s brought a fresh wave of outrageous 
frauds where the company ’ s fi nancial state-
ments were auditor certifi ed. A sample includes 
ZZZZ Best, Crazy Eddie, ESM Government 
Securities, Continental Illinois Bank, and Penn 
Square Bank to name a few. 
 Paul Clikeman chronicled the reaction to 
the two major bank failures in his 2009 book 
 Called To Account : 
 Angered by the costly collapses of Conti-
nental Illinois Bank and Penn Square 
Bank, Dingell announced plans to hold 
seven or eight hearings  ‘ to see how the 
accounting profession is functioning as 
part of the federal regulatory system. ’ 
Noting that nonaudit services and compet-
itive pressures had increased signifi cantly 
during the previous seven years, Dingell 
expressed concern about auditors caving 
in to pressure from clients. Subcommittee 
members wanted to know why so many 
banks failed without receiving a modifi ed 
opinion from their auditors.  
 The hearings did not begin well for the 
accountants. Dingell attacked SAS No. 
16 in his opening statement:  ‘ The public 
expects that independent auditors will 
make reasonable efforts to assure that 
fraudulent corporate activity will not go 
undetected and unreported. And the fi rst 
witness recommended radical changes to 
the public accounting profession. Professor 
Abraham Briloff, a veteran of the Metcalf /
 Moss hearings, urged congress to ban 
public accounting fi rms from providing 
management and advisory services to their 
audit clients. Professor Robert Chatov said 
the SEC should take over the public func-
tion of writing accounting and auditing 
standards. Chatov also wanted the SEC 
to assign auditors to publicly held compa-
nies and rotate the auditors periodically. 
(p. 130) 
 In 1985, fi ve not-for-profi t organizations  – 
AICPA, the American Accounting Association, 
The Institute of Internal Auditors, the National 
Association of Accountants (now the Institute 
of Management Accountants) and the Finan-
cial Executives Institute  – banded together and 
formed the  Committee of Sponsoring Organiza-
tions of the  Treadway Commission to sponsor and 
fund another study to explore the new rash of 
fraudulent fi nancial reporting. The Chairman 
of the Commission was James C. Treadway 
Jr. That Committee became best known as 
a result of self-proclamations COSO. COSO ’ s 
stated founding mission in 1985 was  ‘ to iden-
tify causal factors that can lead to fraudulent 
fi nancial reporting and steps to reduce its inci-
dence ’ (1987, p. 1), an ambitious and noble 
goal at the time. 
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 In October 1987, the Treadway Commis-
sion ’ s fi nal report recommended that,  ‘ The 
Commission ’ s sponsoring organizations should 
cooperate in developing additional, integrated 
guidance on internal control ’ (p. 44). Another 
key recommendation of the Treadway Com-
mission built on recommendations made by the 
Cohen Commission a decade earlier: 
 All public companies should be required by 
SEC rule to include in their annual reports 
to stockholders management reports signed 
by the chief executive offi cer and the chief 
accounting offi cer and / or the chief fi nan-
cial offi cer. The management report should 
acknowledge management ’ s responsibili-
ties for the fi nancial statements and internal 
control, discuss how these responsibilities 
were fulfi lled, and provide management ’ s 
assessment of the effectiveness of the 
company ’ s internal controls. (p. 44) 
 Legal / regulatory response 
 In May of 1986, following the formation of the 
Treadway Commission, Ron Wyden intro duced 
a bill in Congress that would have required 
auditors to report suspicions of fraud to  the SEC. 
Clikeman, in his book  Called to Account , chroni-
cled the reaction of the day. The position taken 
by Arthur Anderson at the time, in light of the 
much later events at Enron and others that led to 
their demise, is particularly ironic. 
 But many people opposed Wyden ’ s Bill. 
Price Waterhouse chairman Joseph E. 
Conner said the proposal would  ‘ convert 
independent auditors into a police state ’ . 
Duane Kullberg of Arthur Anderson said 
the Bill would  ‘ make the auditors surro-
gate for a government investigator ’ and 
would force auditors to reach conclusions 
without giving their clients a chance to 
defend themselves. Even the SEC opposed 
Wyden ’ s Bill, saying it would impose 
unnecessary costs on public companies. 
 Wyden later softened the fraud notifi ca-
tion provisions, but his Bill never gathered 
enough bipartisan support to pass Congress 
or survive a likely veto by the pro-
business, anti-regulation Reagan admin-
istration. Public outrage over accounting 
scandals had not yet reached the level 
necessary to induce government action. 
(2009, p. 131)  
 Treadway ’ s recommendations on management 
reporting on control effectiveness, a recom-
mendation that essentially repeated the Cohen 
Commission ’ s recommendation a decade ear-
lier, was not adopted at the time by the SEC. A 
speech in 1989 by Joseph Grundfest, Commis-
sioner US Securities  & Exchange Commission 
and  Max Berueffy , Counsel to Joseph Grundfest 
summarizing the SEC ’ s and its Commissioner ’ s 
position on the Treadway recommendations: 
 Commissioner Cox . In a recent address 
Commissioner Cox observed that  ‘ the 
Treadway recommendations that, if imple-
mented, would have the greatest impact 
on reducing fraudulent fi nancial reporting 
are basically horatory statements directed 
to corporate managers and are not calls for 
regulatory actions … . Commissioner Cox 
stated the SEC has a relatively  ‘ minor role 
to play in addressing the reforms proposed 
by Treadway ’ . In his view, the relative 
importance of the SEC ’ s role is  ‘ refl ected 
by its response over the past year  – one that 
has exhibited a lack of urgency and has 
included the rejection of certain Treadway 
recommendations ’ . 
 Commissioner Cox also emphasized the 
need for careful cost-benefi t analysis of 
the Treadway recommendations, and 
notes that the Treadway Report is candid 
in stating that companies would incur 
considerable costs in implementing its 
recommendation, and that costs would be 
especially signifi cant. ’  
 Commissioner Grundfest … . Moreover, 
because the costs and benefi ts of specifi c 
Treadway recommendations can differ 
dramatically from company to company 
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without generating commensurate social 
benefi ts  – Commissioner Grundfest recom-
mends that policy makers avoid  ‘ pounding 
square pegs into round holes ’ by forcing 
all companies to comply with standardized 
requirements, regardless of their specifi c 
circumstances. (p. 5) 
 What is clear from this 1989 speech is that the 
SEC of the day did not think this was a problem 
that they should address; and that reporting on 
control effectiveness would be a costly exercise 
that would not produce benefi ts commensurate 
with the cost. 
 UNRELIABLE FINANCIAL 
REPORTING  – WAVE #3  – 
ENRON / WORLDCOM PERFECT 
STORM 
 Paul Clikeman ’ s book provides a concise 
summary of the events that have been called 
the perfect storm of unreliable fi nancial 
reporting. 
 The Dow Jones Industrial Average reached 
an all-time high of 11  723 on January 14, 
2000. But 316 earnings restatements in 
2000 and 2001 revealed that many high-
fl ying technology fi rms of the late 1990s 
were not nearly as profi table as had been 
claimed. Enron ’ s bankruptcy in December 
2001 shattered investors ’ confi dence. The 
DJIA dropped more than 2000 points 
during the fi rst half of 2002 amid fears that 
other  ‘ Enrons ’ remained undiscovered. 
 ‘ This is the biggest crisis investors have 
had since 1929, ’ said accounting analyst 
Howard M. Schilit.  ‘ Investors don ’ t know 
who they can trust. ’ Clearly, investors 
didn ’ t trust accountants. CPAs, once held 
in high esteem by the American public, 
fell below politicians and journalists in 
public opinion polls.  
 WorldCom was the proverbial straw 
that broke the camel ’ s back. New York 
Times Columnist Floyd Norris Attrib-
uted Sarbanes-Oxley to WorldCom 
CEO Bernie Ebbers.  ‘ His name is not on 
the law, but maybe it should be, ’ Norris 
wrote. (2009, p. 278) 
 Legal / regulatory response 
 In the face of the Enron / WorldCom perfect 
storm, even the Republicans decided that 
they could not risk denying there was a 
problem that warranted government inter-
vention. The Sarbanes – Oxley Act of 2002 
was signed in to law  – a response enacted in 
record time with almost unanimous support 
of both the Democrats and the Republicans 
parties. Management reporting on control 
effectiveness, dismissed in the 1970s when 
fi rst recommended by the Cohen Commis-
sion, and again in the 1980s when proposed 
by the Treadway Commission on the basis 
that it would not produce benefi ts commen-
surate with the cost, was historically approved 
by both parties . Section 404 is a deceptively 
small, but core and massively costly element 
of the Act. The SEC administration of the 
day, regardless of earlier misgivings of SEC ’ s 
Commissioners regarding the cost / benefi t 
equation, was assigned the task of imple-
menting the most radical reform of secu-
rity regulation in the history of the United 
States. 
 Key elements of SOX that illustrate the 
reforms called for in past studies include: 
 1.  Stripping the self-regulation rights of the 
AICPA and the creation of the PCAOB to 
police the audit profession  – a recommen-
dation made by Professor Robert Chatov 
at the Dingell hearings on the accounting 
profession in the 1980s. 
 2.  Implementation of Professor Abraham 
Brilloff ’ s recommendation at the Dingell 
hearings in the 1980s to restrict the range 
of management services public accounting 
fi rms were allowed to do to reduce confl icts 
of interest. 
 3.  Implementing an annual certifi cation on 
the effectiveness of internal controls over 
fi nancial reporting  – a recommendation 
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fi rst made by the Cohen Commission in 
1978. 
 4.  Requiring a report from the company ’ s 
external auditor on the effectiveness of 
inter nal control over fi nancial reporting  – 
implementing a recommendation made 
22 years earlier by the Cohen Commission. 
 In order for companies to comply with SOX 
404, they had to use a control framework 
deemed  ‘ suitable ’ by the SEC. The control 
framework that virtually all public compa-
nies elected to use at the time and still use 
today, a framework deemed  ‘ suitable ’ by the 
SEC, was COSO ’ s 1992 Internal Control 
Integrated Framework, sponsored by the COSO 
Committee. The COSO committee was the 
result of the 1987 Treadway Commission rec-
ommendation that the Commission ’ s sponsor-
ing organizations develop guidance on internal 
control. The authors of this 1992 framework 
were partners and staff of Coopers  & Lybrand 
( Note : Coopers  & Lybrand has now become 
PricewaterhouseCoopers in the era of  ‘ the 
big four ’ , one of the  ‘ big 8 ’ auditing fi rms in 
existence at the time). 
 What was massively underestimated at the 
time SOX was enacted was just how costly the 
two short paragraphs that comprise Section 404 
would prove to be. The bill did not call for any 
formal public effectiveness review to determine 
whether the legislation was actually successful in 
achieving its central stated purpose to  ‘ protect 
investors by improving the accuracy and reli-
ability of corporate disclosures made pursuant 
to securities laws, and for other purposes ’ (US 
Congress, 2002), and no independent hearing 
has been held since it was enacted to probe 
that question. 
 UNRELIABLE FINANCIAL 
REPORTING WAVE #4  – THE 
GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS 
 Few people in the business world are unaware 
that a signifi cant number of the world ’ s largest 
fi nancial institutions hovered on the brink of 
bankruptcy in late 2008 and early 2009. In the 
case of a few fi nancial companies in jeopardy, 
the US government mysteriously deemed them 
unworthy of saving and they were forced to 
declare bankruptcy. Others were considered 
too big to fail or were simply included on the 
bailout list because of the global panic and saved 
at a massive cost at the time to the US Treasury 
and other governments around the world. 
 There is little doubt that the fi nancial 
statements of hundreds of major banks and 
companies in the period leading up to the 
global fi nancial crisis were materially wrong. 
In spite of their decisions to make massive 
 ‘ bet the farm ’ -type bets on seriously risky 
assets, Lehman Brothers, AIG, Bear Stearns, 
Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, Bank of America 
and others were all deemed in the period 
leading up to the global crisis by their CEOs, 
CFOs and external audit fi rms to have  ‘ effec-
tive ’ systems of internal control over fi nan-
cial reporting in accordance with the dated 
and obsolete COSO 1992 Internal Control 
Integrated Control framework. ( Leech, 2008 ). 
What is less clear is whether fi nancial state-
ments were prepared correctly, following rules 
of the day that companies and their auditors 
were obliged to follow and, of even more 
importance, whether accounting and auditing 
rules, including SOX 404 reporting, were fol-
lowed correctly; however, the fi nancial state-
ments were still massively wrong. This state 
would be best summarized as  – correctly pre-
pared in accordance with the rules of the day, 
including management representations that 
internal control was effective in accordance 
with COSO ’ s 1992 integrated control frame-
work; correctly audited in accordance with 
PCAOB auditing standards, including external 
auditors opining that the company maintained 
 ‘ effective ’ internal controls; but massively mis-
stated and, in many cases, virtually insolvent in 
the absence of government intervention. 
 Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. is one 
example of a fi rm at the center of the global 
crisis that reported clean control effectiveness 
certifi cations. The key paragraph noted in the 
Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc. 10K fi ling, 
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dated 30 November 2007, from their CEO 
and CFO reads as follows:  ‘ The Company ’ s 
management assessed the effectiveness of the 
Company ’ s internal control over fi nancial 
reporting as of November 30, 2007. In making 
this assessment, it used the criteria set forth by 
the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of 
the Treadway Commission (COSO) in Internal 
Control – Integrated Framework. Based on our 
assessment we believe that, as of November 
30, 2007, the Company ’ s internal control over 
fi nancial reporting is effective based on those 
criteria ’ (p. 82) . The key paragraph from the 
Ernst  & Young external audit opinion in the 
same fi ling,  ‘ In our opinion, the Company 
maintained, in all material respects, effective 
internal control over fi nancial reporting as of 
30 November 2007, based on the COSO cri-
teria ’ (p. 83) . Again, on 30 May 2008,  Lehman 
Brother Holding Inc ’ s CEO and CFO pro-
vided a clean SOX 404 opinion in heir 10Q 
fi ling (p. 109). 
 The PCAOB Investors Advisory Committee 
drew on a sample of failed fi nancial institutions 
at the center of the global fi nancial crisis in 
a 16 March 2011 report shown in  Figure 1 . 
This table puts the spotlight on fi nancial 
institutions that issued unqualifi ed fi nancial 
opinions, including SOX 404 control effective-
ness opinions, and the related investor losses 
(p. 6) in the period leading up to the collapse. 
Again, it is important to note that these fi rms 
certifi ed that accounting controls over the 
areas that later proved to be toxic for inves-
tors, including the risk management dimension 
of those controls, were rated as  ‘ effective ’ in 
accordance with criteria in the 1992 COSO 
Internal Control Integrated Framework by the 
company ’ s CEO, CFO and external auditors. 
 Legal / regulatory response 
 As of the date this article was fi nalized, govern-
ments and regulators around the world were 
just beginning, at least in any serious way, 
to analyze and report fi ndings on the role of 
accounting and auditing in the global fi nancial 
crisis. 
 Commissions and hearings were convened 
in the United States and in other countries 
around the globe, to try and identify root 
causes of the unprecedented US corporate 
governance breakdown. As part of this root 
cause analysis, G-20 leaders requested the 
IASB and the FASB evaluate and report on 
 Figure 1 :   PCAOB Investor Advisory Group 16 March 2011 Presentation  The Watchdog that 
Didn ’ t Bark Again . 
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what went wrong in the area of accounting 
and auditing standards. The result was the 
creation of the FCAG. This group, after a 
relatively short and cursory study of the issue 
given its importance, concluded,  ‘ Accounting 
was not a root cause of the fi nancial crisis, 
but it has an important role to play in its 
resolution ’ (2009) . 
 In the United Kingdom, the House of Lords 
Economic Affairs Committee, one of many 
groups charged with studying what caused the 
great fi nancial crisis of 2008, did not accept 
the position taken by the FCAG and other  ‘ blue 
chip commissions ’ studying the global crisis, 
which had concluded that accounting, and 
external audits that certifi ed the accounting, 
were not signifi cant contributory causes of 
the global crisis. This brave and lonely UK 
Committee has launched the most strident 
attack on the accounting and auditing  status 
quo to date: 
 We do not accept the defence that 
bank auditors did all that was required 
of them. In the light of what we now 
know, that defence appears disconcert-
ingly complacent.  ‘ It may be that the Big 
Four carried out their duties properly in 
the strictly legal sense, but we have to 
conclude that, in the wider sense, they 
did not do so. It cannot (or at least should 
not) be taken for granted by auditors that 
banks in diffi culties will be bailed out by 
the authorities and the taxpayers. We do 
not accept therefore that this should at 
any time be a decisive consideration in 
making the  ‘ going concern ’ judgment. 
(2011, para. 142 and 144).  
 The UK House of Lords Economic Affairs Com-
mittee has clearly taken the lead in calling the 
accounting and auditing professions to account 
for these defi ciencies: 
 The banking crisis of 2007 – 2009 raised 
the question (among others) why there 
was so little warning that so many banks 
were in trouble and that the world ’ s fi nan-
cial system was at risk. The role of auditors 
in the crisis is naturally of most interest to 
this inquiry. We do not seek to appor-
tion blame but to draw lessons, bearing 
in mind that, with hindsight, responsi-
bility for the crisis and the lack of warning 
was shared by almost all the players in the 
system. As Lord Myners put it,  ‘ the fi nan-
cial crisis revealed the failure of just about 
everybody  … [but] the auditing profes-
sion, the accounting profession, cannot 
be excluded from those who must share 
responsibility and, more importantly, seek 
to learn lessons ’ . (2011, para. 138) 
 A day after the UK  House of Lords report 
was released, the PCAOB Investors Advisory 
Group called for an in-depth investigation of 
the role of auditors in the crisis (2011). The 
 PCAOB Investor Advisory Group in their 
16 March 2011 meeting noted in their presen-
tation slides entitled  The Watchdog that Didn ’ t 
Bark …  Again ,  ‘ While auditors did not cause 
the fi nancial crisis, it is diffi cult to look at 
the list of failed institutions that received an 
unqualifi ed audit just months before they failed 
and conclude that auditors didn ’ t play a 
role ’ (p. 6). The same presentation also que-
stions Sarbanes – Oxley,  ‘ The fi nancial crisis of 
2008 raises signifi cant questions about why 
the Sarbanes-Oxley reforms failed to bring 
about the promised improvements to the 
independence and quality of public company 
audits. In Europe and the United Kingdom, 
these questions are receiving signifi cant atten-
tion from regulators and policymakers. But, so 
far at least, the United States has lagged behind 
in that evaluation ’ (p. 17) . 
 Pending litigation against virtually all 
the major audit fi rms linked to the global 
fi nancial crisis has understandably and nega-
tively impacted the willingness and ability of 
accounting and auditing experts from these 
fi rms to offer candid and objective testimony. 
A number of current SEC and PCAOB staff 
are ex-Big 6 audit fi rm staff members, or are 
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on secondment from the Big 6 audit fi rms that 
are now the subject of litigation related to their 
performance leading up to the global crisis. 
Expressing opinions deemed detrimental to 
their past or potentially future employers could 
be very dangerous. Also, a number of SEC and 
PCAOB staff that would be expected to objec-
tively examine the issues and the perform-
ance of audit fi rms leading up to the crisis are 
accounting professors on secondment from US 
universities that have close fi nancial ties with 
the major accounting and auditing fi rms. Many 
major US universities have chairs endowed 
by the Big 6 accounting fi rms. Publicly raising 
serious concerns with the audit profession ’ s 
performance in the global crisis could materi-
ally and negatively impact future accounting 
faculty funding and damage relationships with 
the major audit fi rms. 
 In the United States,  the Senate Committee 
on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs met 
on 6 April 2011 to explore the topic of  The 
Role of the Accounting Profession in Preventing 
another Financial Crisis . The testimony of Lynn 
Turner, an outspoken critic of the accounting 
profession, is particularly interesting. Excerpts 
from his testimony that day are included 
below: 
 Unfortunately, as described later on, gate-
keepers including the auditors did play 
a role in the fi nancial crisis. They failed 
to act on and provide information avai-
lable to them to investors. This left 
investors much like the ship Titanic as 
it approached an unforeseen iceberg, 
without any red fl ags or warnings of the 
imminent dangers. In doing so, the audi-
tors helped contribute to a crisis in confi -
dence. (2011, p. 6) 
 The failure on numerous occasions of 
the FASB to issue timely standards that 
would provide the capital market parti-
cipants with the information necessary 
to make informed decisions when allo-
cating capital, has proven costly. Failed 
standards such as those related to off 
balance sheet debt and disclosures of risks 
and uncertainties have resulted in the 
capital markets being ineffi cient due to a 
lack of important information. It also has 
resulted in markets being unable to effec-
tively discipline themselves. Any notion 
that  ‘ free markets ’ can and will regulate 
themselves has gone out the window. (p. 10) 
 It should be no surprise that investors 
both in the US and abroad, are asking 
 ‘ where were the auditors? ’ The fi ndings 
of the PCAOB and others have raised 
a question as to whether auditors were 
in fact acting as objective examiners of 
the fi nancial reports. Some have also 
questioned whether the auditors main-
tained the requisite level of profes-
sional scepticism as they performed their 
audits. Others are questioning the funda-
mental value of an audit in today ’ s digital 
world and whether audits are relevant. 
(pp. 11 – 12) 
 It seems as if Congress agrees the FASB ’ s 
independence is important  – but only 
so long as some constituency isn ’ t being 
pushed towards greater transparency by 
the FASB. I would hope that someday 
Congress can fi nd a better balance between 
its oversight responsibilities with respect to 
accounting standard setting, the need for 
millions of American investors to receive 
transparent information, and the demands 
of special interest groups. (pp. 15 – 16) 
 Others such as Warren Buffet have also 
recommended there be greater transparency 
with respect to the discussions between 
audit committees, auditors, and fi nancial 
management, including with respect to 
internal controls, completeness of disclo-
sures and whether adjustments are needed 
to reported numbers or not. (p. 18) 
 In fact, despite over 14  000 audit opinions 
issued on an annual basis by auditors of 
public entities, almost 4900 restatements 
of fi nancial statements being reported 
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during the years 2005 through 2010, and 
a signifi cant increase in the number of 
violations of the Foreign Corrupt Practices 
Act ( ‘ FCPA ’ ), there has been on average 
 less than one class action lawsuit brought 
each year against each of the ten largest 
auditing fi rms during that same period. 
As a result it is not surprising the ACAP 1 
was unable to reach a consensus that any 
further litigation reform is necessary for 
auditors. (pp. 21 – 22) 
 The last comment excerpted from Lynn Turner ’ s 
testimony is particularly important. Although 
Mr Turner has referenced 4900 restatements, 
neither the auditing profession nor the SEC 
or PCAOB have launched a serious study to 
determine the root causes of those accounting 
failures. Efforts that have been made are piece-
meal and largely done by point-in-time Com-
missions calling for anecdotal evidence; not 
serious, empirical fact-based analysis conducted 
by independent and objective researchers. 
 In the wake of the global fi nancial crisis, 
commissions were convened to also study the 
root causes of the problem. These commissions 
have converged on the belief that defi cient risk 
management and defi cient board-level risk 
oversight are two of the root causes of the 
global fi nancial crisis. The highly infl uential 
SSG, a group made up of fi nancial regulators 
of the world ’ s most powerful economies, con-
cluded that the roots of the global fi nancial 
crisis are linked to the following: 
 The failure of some boards of directors 
and senior managers to establish, measure, 
and adhere to a level of risk acceptable 
to the fi rm; compensation programs that 
confl icted with the control objectives of 
the fi rm; inadequate and often fragmented 
technological infrastructures that hindered 
effective risk identifi cation and measure-
ment; and institutional arrangements that 
conferred status and infl uence on risk 
takers at the expense of independent risk 
managers and control personnel. (2009, 
introductory letter) 
 The  Report of the NACD Blue Ribbon Commission 
on Risk Governance: Balancing Risk and Reward , 
while not directly suggesting defi cient board 
oversight of risk was a root causes of the global 
crisis, did infer it: 
 Given the events of 2008 – 2009, it is clear 
that a broader view of risk in the context 
of strategic decision making is needed to 
help organizations properly engage risk 
and its consequences  – with the aim of 
restoring public confi dence in the role 
of boards, and in corporate governance. 
In this report, the BRC recommends the 
following ten principles to guide directors 
in their efforts to provide effective over-
sight of risk: (1) Understand the compa-
ny ’ s key drivers of success. (2) Assess the 
risk in the company ’ s strategy. (3) Defi ne 
the role of the full board and its stand ing 
committees with regard to risk oversight. 
(4) Consider whether the com pany ’ s risk 
management system  – including people 
and processes  – is appropriate and has 
suffi cient resources. (5) Work with man-
agement to understand and agree on the 
types (and format) of risk information the 
board requires. (6) Encourage a dynamic 
and constructive risk dialogue between 
management and the board, including 
a willingness to challenge assumptions. 
(7) Closely monitor the potential risks in 
the company ’ s culture and its incentive 
structure. (8) Monitor critical alignments  – 
of strategy, risk, controls, compliance, incen-
tives, and people. (9) Consider emerging 
and interrelated risks: What ’ s around the 
next corner? (10) Periodically assess the 
board ’ s risk oversight processes: Do they 
enable the board to achieve its risk over-
sight objectives? ( NACD, 2009, pp. 2 – 3 ) 
 Make no mistake  – the root problems iden-
tifi ed by the infl uential SSG, and the gov-
ernance defi ciencies inferred by the NACD 
Blue Ribbon Commission noted above, 
directly impacted the reliability of the fi nan-
cial statements of the institutions at the center 
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of this storm in the period leading up to 
the global crisis. 
 It appears that there is a noticeable shift 
occurring not only from the SSG and the 
NACD, but also from regulators around the 
world, which is resulting in demands for sig-
nifi cantly greater focus on risk management and 
risk management oversight. 
 In February 2011,  Carlo V. di Florio , Director 
Offi ce of Compliance Inspections and Exami-
nations, US Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion noted in his remarks at the CCOutreach 
National Seminar: 
 The fi nancial crisis revealed just how 
dramatically risk management failures can 
harm investors, jeopardize market inte grity 
and hinder capital formation. It also revealed 
the interdependence between various 
risk categories (e.g., liquidity, funding, 
market, credit, operational, compliance 
and reputation risks), and demonstrated 
how that interdependence can accelerate 
risk concentration and harm to investors 
and markets. 
 Finally, the fi nancial crisis revealed the 
need for better oversight of risk at the 
board and senior management levels, 
and the need for stronger independ-
ence, standing and authority among risk 
management, control and compliance 
functions so senior management and 
the board understand the true risk in the 
business model and more proactive and 
effective risk management decisions can 
be made timely. 
 As of the date this article was written, the 
best way to summarize the fi ndings of various 
commissions on the role of reliable accounting 
and auditing in the global fi nancial crisis is  – 
 ‘ The jury ’ s still out ’  – literally, in the case 
of some CEOs and CFOs at the center of 
the crisis and a number of the world ’ s largest 
auditing fi rms, and fi guratively in the case of 
US Congress, FASB, the SEC, PCAOB, US 
fi nancial regulators and others. 
 The IASB and FASB, in spite of claiming 
bad accounting was not a key element of the 
problem, are scrambling to push through changes 
to plug at least some of the holes that allowed 
major fi nancial institutions to legitimately con-
ceal their true fi nancial position. Many experts 
believe that the lawsuits fi led to date, including 
a state of New York action against Ernst and 
Young linked to Lehman Brothers, are just the 
start of a much larger assault on why the fi nan-
cial statements of some of the world ’ s largest 
company ’ s were subsequently found to be mas-
sively wrong. 
 THE  ‘ CONTROL-CENTRIC ’ 
APPROACH TO RELIABLE 
FINANCIAL STATEMENTS  – 
WHAT IS IT AND WHAT ARE 
ITS DEFICIENCIES? 
 In 2002, Section 404 of the Sarbanes – Oxley 
Act of 2002 ( ‘ SOX ’ ) stated: 
 (a)  RULES REQUIRED.  – The Com -
mission shall prescribe rules requiring 
each annual report required by 
Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 to contain an 
internal control report which shall  –  
  (1)  State the responsibility of manage-
ment for establishing and main-
taining an adequate control 
structure and procedures for fi nan-
cial reporting; and 
  (2)  Contain an assessment, as of the 
end of the most recent fi scal year 
of the issuer, of the effectiveness 
of internal control structures and 
procedures of the issuer for fi nan-
cial reporting. 
 (b)  INTERNAL CONTROL EVAL-
UATION AND REPORTING  – 
With respect to the internal control 
assessment required by subsection 
(a), each registered public accounting 
fi rm that prepares or issues the audit 
report for the issuer shall attest to, 
and report on, the assessment made 
 Preventing the next wave of unreliable ﬁ nancial reporting 
© 2011 Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 1741-3591 International Journal of Disclosure and Governance Vol. 8, 4, 295–322 309
by the management of the issurer. 
An attestation made under this 
subsection shall be made in accord-
ance with standards for attestation 
engagements issued or adopted by 
the Board. Any such attestations 
shall not be the subject of a separate 
engagement. (Section 404) 
 The genesis of the SOX 404 legislation was 
drawn from conclusions of Commissions that 
studied the problem of unreliable accounting 
dating back to the late 1970s referenced earlier 
in this article. Those commissions called for 
reports on  ‘ control effectiveness ’ . Although 25 
years after Cohen fi rst called for it, SOX 404 
made it the law of the land. Other countries, 
including Canada and Japan, have followed suit 
and now require management representations 
on  ‘ control effectiveness ’ . 
 The SOX 404 sections referenced above 
were initially implemented via the much 
maligned and criticized Auditing Standard 
No. 2 ( ‘ AS2 ’ ) enacted by the PCAOB. The 
focus of AS2 was on documenting and testing 
controls. A word search analysis of AS 2 reveals 
that it uses the word  ‘ risk ’ 98 times compared 
with 1802 instances of the word  ‘ control ’ . 
When the implementation of this auditing 
standard resulted in the SEC ’ s original cost 
estimates of  $ 91  000 ( SEC, 2003, p. 41 ) per 
registrant, then escalating in the case of even 
medium-sized fi lers to millions of dollars, with 
the total cost of SOX 404 compliance run-
ning in the billions of dollars globally, Auditing 
Standard No. 2 was scrapped and replaced by 
Auditing Standard No. 5 ( ‘ AS5 ’ ). The PCAOB 
was told by the SEC to come up with a more 
 ‘ risk-based ’ approach. 
 The PCAOB, listening to the resounding 
global criticism of the cost of AS2, made a ten-
tative attempt to respond to criticism. In AS5, 
the word  ‘ risk ’ appears 193 times versus the word 
 ‘ control ’ , which appears 943 times. No attempt 
was made by the PCAOB at the time, as 
far as public records and inquiries to the 
PCAOB reveal, to actually consult risk experts 
or international risk management standards 
to develop a true  ‘ risk-based ’ approach. The 
fi xation on documenting processes and testing 
controls in AS5 suggests that the PCAOB 
authors tried to modify their core thinking, but 
continued to approach their task drawing on 
out-dated auditing protocols and terminology 
that were originally developed in the late 
1970s, together with the core tenets of COSO 
Internal Control Integrated Framework, a con-
trol framework developed around 1990 – 1991, 
more than two decades ago. 
 A section of AS5, PCAOB ’ s second attempt 
at SOX 404 regulation, does suggest that audi-
tors should complete a  ‘ risk assessment ’ , and 
states that auditors should focus  ‘ more of his 
or her attention on the areas of highest risk ’ . 
( Note : presumably  ‘ more ’ means more than 
auditors did using the guidance of AS2 which 
wasn ’ t much). The relevant section of AS5 is 
reproduced below: 
 Role of risk assessment 
 10. Risk assessment underlies the entire 
audit process described by this standard, 
including the determination of signifi cant 
accounts and disclosures and relevant 
assertions, the selection of controls to test, 
and the determination of the evidence 
necessary for a given control. 
 11. A direct relationship exists between 
the degree of risk that a material weak-
ness could exist in a particular area of the 
company ’ s internal control over fi nancial 
reporting and the amount of audit atten-
tion that should be devoted to that area. 
In addition, the risk that a company ’ s 
internal control over fi nancial reporting 
will fail to prevent or detect misstatement 
caused by fraud usually is higher than the 
risk of failure to prevent or detect error. 
The auditor should focus more of his 
or her attention on the areas of highest 
risk. On the other hand, it is not neces-
sary to test controls that, even if defi cient, 
would not present a reasonable possibility 
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of material misstatement to the fi nancial 
statements. 
 12. The complexity of the organization, 
business unit, or process, will play an 
important role in the auditor  s risk assess-
ment and the determination of the necessary 
procedures. ( PCAOB, 2007, pp. A1 – A8 ) 
 What AS5 doesn ’ t do is specifi cally require 
that external auditors determine statistically 
what the most common root causes of material 
accounting misstatements are generally; what 
are the most common root causes of misstate-
ments for the business sector being audited; 
what are the most common causes of material 
errors in the books of the specifi c company 
they are auditing; or provide any substantial 
guidance on how to identify and assess the 
likelihood and consequence of risks to the reli-
ability of specifi c account balances and supple-
mental note disclosures given the current  ‘ risk 
treatments ’ in place. AS5 also does not suggest 
that auditors use authoritative guidance on  ‘ risk 
assessment ’ provided by the globally accepted 
risk management standards, such as  ISO 31000 , 
or even the risk assessment approach recom-
mended in the much criticized 2004 COSO 
ERM framework to identify and assess risks to 
the reliability of the fi nancial statements. These 
assessment frameworks are not deemed to be 
 ‘ suitable ’ frameworks by the SEC. 
 On the basis of a comparison of AS5 
and contemporary risk management standards, 
such as the ISO 31000 Risk Management 
Standard, it would appear that the PCAOB 
connotation of  ‘ risk-based ’ control assessment 
and auditing dates back to concepts used by 
the accounting profession in the late 1970s, 
not risk assessment approaches generally 
accepted today by the global risk management 
community. 
 In the years following the introduction of 
SOX 404, compliance costs spiraled. Unfortu-
nately, as shown in the fallout of the fi nancial 
global crisis, the massively high SOX 404 com-
pliance costs did not produce signifi cantly more 
reliable fi nancial statements. 
 An Institute of Management Accountants 
discussion paper concluded: 
 In February 2007, Audit Analytics pub -
lished,  ‘ 2006 Financial Restatements: 
A Six Year Comparison. ’ One of the 
most profound trends highlighted in this 
report is that 512 US Accelerated Filers 
(companies with market capitalization in 
excess of  $ 75 million) issued restatements 
in 2006 to correct one or more material 
errors in their original accounting fi lings 
with the SEC. With a total reported 
registrant population of 3861 Accelerated 
Filers, that represents an error rate of 13.3 
per cent. Stated simply, the rate of material 
errors being corrected in original fi lings 
by Accelerated Filers in 2006 was more 
than one in every eight. (2008, p. 5) 
 Ignoring for a minute the massively unreliable 
fi nancial statements published by the com-
panies at the heart of the 2008 global crisis 
referenced in the last section, more current 
research suggests that there have been some 
signs of progress. A 2010 report produced by 
Audit Analytics 2010 suggested that the fre-
quency of restatements had improved from the 
dismal performance in 2006. Financial state-
ment restatements issued by companies covered 
by Sarbanes-Oxley 404 in 2010 at that time 
were running around 5 per cent or, stated 
another way, one in every 20 auditor-
certifi ed fi nancial statements was later found 
to have material errors that required restate-
ments under US GAAP. It is important to 
note that virtually all of the fi nancial state-
ments that had to be restated to correct 
material accounting errors contained CEO /
 CFO / External Auditor SOX certifi cations 
in the original fi lings that stated the internal 
accounting controls over fi nancial reporting 
are  ‘ effective ’ .  ‘ Effective ’ is a term defi ned 
generally by the PCAOB and SEC as a con-
clusion that the controls that support the reli-
ability of fi nancial disclosures are capable of 
preventing even a single material accounting 
error / misrepresentation. 
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 The cost of SOX 404 compliance today, 
while lower than costs experienced during 
the implementation stage, continues globally 
to be in the billions of dollars each year. 
SOX 404 compliance costs are so onerous 
that US Congress, via the 2010 Frank-Dodd 
Act, decided that in spite of the original Act 
calling for Section 404 (a) and (b) to apply to all 
public companies, small-cap public companies 
would be exempt from the complying with 
SOX Section 404(b) that requires auditors attest 
to the effectiveness of controls. 
 Although the SEC has made a few, what 
are best referred to as, poorly funded and 
half-hearted efforts to evaluate the cost / benefi t 
of Sarbanes – Oxley Section 404, what has not 
been done, at least not in any serious way, 
is empirical research to determine the impact 
of SOX 404 compliance on the actual reli-
ability of fi nancial statements (that is how 
much more reliable are fi nancial statements 
post Sarbanes – Oxley than they were before 
SOX; how much more reliable are statements 
year over year; and how does the reliability 
of statements from US listed companies com-
pare to other jurisdictions such as Canada 
and the United States that have less costly 
regimes). This is true, in spite of the fact 
that collectively over 19  000 US listed com-
panies, including major corporations with 
headquarters in other countries, incur SOX 
404 compliance costs in the billions of dollars 
each year, and the fact that accounting and 
auditing practices leading up to the global 
fi nancial crisis are now coming under intense 
scrutiny. ( Note : small-cap companies are 
exempted from SOX 404(b) but must still 
comply with SOX 404(a)). 
 Can the control-centric approach to SOX 
404 withstand the scrutiny to come? It would 
appear that organizations such as the SSG 
and NACD are already moving forward to 
focus on risk oversight and risk management, 
as noted in this article ’ s fi nancial global crisis 
analysis. Security regulators are also moving 
in this direction. In 2004, the New York 
Stock Exchange adopted governance rules 
that require audit committees of listed fi rms to 
oversee management ’ s risk oversight processes. 
In 2009, the SEC introduced new proxy dis-
closure rules, requiring US listed companies to 
include information about the board ’ s involve-
ment in risk oversight in their annual proxy. 
Given the regulatory focus on the importance 
of effective risk management, if SOX 404 is 
left unchanged as a representation on  ‘ control 
effectiveness ’ , it will be increasingly be out 
of sync with the broadly accepted belief that 
more effective risk management is what is really 
needed going forward. 
 WHAT WOULD A TRUE  ‘ RISK-
CENTRIC ’ APPROACH TO SOX 
404 LOOK LIKE? 
 Simply put, a true risk-centric approach to 
SOX 404 would use a  ‘ risk-based targeting ’ 2 
approach to allocate assurance resources, and 
would manifest attributes of an  ‘ enhanced risk 
management ’ framework, such as the descrip-
tion offered in Annex A of the International 
Standard ISO 31000 Risk Management  – 
Principles and Guidelines, considered one of 
the world ’ s leading risk management frame-
works. The approach would be specifi c to 
the overall objective of producing materially 
fault-free fi nancial reporting. Annex A of the 
ISO 31000 is reproduced below. Permission 
to use portions of ISO 31000 was provided 
by Standards Council of Canada. No further 
reproduction is permitted without prior 
written approval from Standards Council of 
Canada. 
 
 ISO 31000  – ANNEX A 
 
 Attributes of Enhanced Risk Management 
 
 A.1 General 
 All organizations should aim at the appropriate 
level of performance of their risk management frame-
work in line with the criticality of the decisions that 
are to be made. The list of attributes below repre-
sents a high level of performance in managing risk. 
To assist organizations in measuring their own 
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performance against these criteria, some tangible 
indicators are given for each attribute. 
 
 A.2 Key outcomes  
 
 A.2.1 The organization has a current, correct and 
comprehensive understanding of its risks. 
 
 A.2.2 The organization ’ s risks are within its risk 
criteria. 
 
 A.3 Attributes 
 
 A.3.1 Continual improvement 
 An emphasis is placed on continual improvement in 
risk management through the setting of organizational 
performance goals, measurement, review and the sub-
sequent modifi cation of processes, systems, resources, 
capability and skills. This can be indicated by the 
existence of explicit performance goals against which 
the organization ’ s and individual manager ’ s perform-
ance is measured. The organization ’ s performance 
can be published and communicated. Normally, there 
will be at least an annual review of performance 
and then a revision of processes, and the setting of 
revised performance objectives for the following period. 
This risk management performance assessment is an 
integral part of the overall organization ’ s performance 
assessment and measurement system for departments 
and individuals. 
 
 A.3.2 Full accountability for risks 
 Enhanced risk management includes comprehensive, 
fully defi ned and fully accepted accountability for 
risks, controls and risk treatment tasks. Designated 
individuals fully accept accountability, are appropri-
ately skilled and have adequate resources to check 
con trols, monitor risks, improve controls and com-
municate effectively about risks and their manage-
ment to external and internal stakeholders. This can 
be indicated by all members of an organization being 
fully aware of the risks, controls and tasks for which 
they are accountable. Normally, this will be recorded 
in job / position descriptions, databases or information 
systems. The defi nition of risk management roles, 
accountabilities and responsibilities should be part of 
all the organization ’ s induction programmes. The 
organization ensures that those who are accountable 
are equipped to fulfi l that role by providing them 
with the authority, time, training, resources and skills 
suffi cient to assume their accountabilities. 
 
 A.3.3 Application of risk management in all deci-
sion making 
 All decision making within the organization, whatever 
the level of importance and signifi cance, involves the 
explicit consideration of risks and the application of risk 
management to some appropriate degree. This can be 
indicated by records of meetings and decisions to show 
that explicit discussions on risks took place. In addi-
tion, it should be possible to see that all components 
of risk management are represented within key proc-
esses for decision making in the organization, e.g. for 
decisions on the allocation of capital, on major projects 
and on re-structuring and organizational changes. For 
these reasons, soundly based risk management is seen 
within the organization as providing the basis for effec-
tive governance. 
 
 A.3.4 Continual communications 
 Enhanced risk management includes continual com-
munications with external and internal stakeholders, 
including comprehensive and frequent reporting of risk 
management performance, as part of good governance.
This can be indicated by communication with stake-
holders as an integral and essential component of risk 
management. Communication is rightly seen as a two-
way process, such that properly informed decisions can 
be made about the level of risks and the need for risk 
treatment against properly established and comprehen-
sive risk criteria. Comprehensive and frequent external 
and internal reporting on both signifi cant risks and on 
risk management performance contributes substantially 
to effective governance within an organization. 
 
 A.3.5 Full integration in the organization ’ s govern-
ance structure 
 Risk management is viewed as central to the organi-
zation ’ s management processes, such that risks are 
considered in terms of effect of uncertainty on objec-
tives. The governance structure and process are based 
on the management of risk. Effective risk manage-
ment is regarded by managers as essential for the 
achievement of the organization ’ s objectives. This 
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is indicated by managers ’ language and important 
written materials in the organization using the term 
 ‘ uncertainty ’ in connection with risks. This attribute 
is also normally refl ected in the organization ’ s state-
ments of policy, particularly those relating to risk 
management. Normally, this attribute would be veri-
fi ed through interviews with managers and through 
the evidence of their actions and statements. 
 The current approach to SOX 404 man-
dated by the SEC and PCAOB, while claiming 
to be  ‘ risk-based ’ , is not in fact risk-based, at 
least not from the perspective of risk manage-
ment professionals and standards. This con-
clusion is supported by the following authors ’ 
observations: 
 Registrants are currently forced by the SEC 
rules to use COSO Internal Control Inte-
grated Framework, a  ‘ control framework ’ , not 
a risk framework, as the primary assessment 
criteria to complete the assessment; 
 The vast majority of SOX 404 assessments 
today are done with no attempt to utilize 
statistical information on the most likely 
areas where material accounting errors and 
irregularities occur; 
 The vast majority of SOX 404 assessments do 
not direct assurance resources to assessment 
and testing areas proportionate with their sta-
tistically probable and highest impact risks; 
 The current standards do not require a formal 
review when SOX 404 control opinions and 
the supporting external audit opinions are 
found to be wrong to determine what went 
wrong; 
 The current SEC and PCAOB standards 
provide virtually no guidance on how to 
actually identify risks that threaten the reli-
ability of the fi nancial statements as a whole, 
or specifi c account balances and note disclo-
sures, and how to identify and analyze the 
likely effectiveness of the  ‘ risk treatments ’ in 
place to mitigate those risks. 
 In addition to the global risk manage-






underway currently, including efforts by 
the Institute of Internal Auditors and Open 
Compliance  & Ethics Group ( ‘ OCEG ’ ), to 
develop formal guidance management and 
auditors can use to assess whether an organiza-
tion has, or does not have  ‘ effective risk mana-
gement processes ’ . Whether the approach 
used should result in a binary opinion (that is, 
effective / ineffective), like the one currently 
required by SEC / PCAOB SOX 404 regula-
tions, or ordinal (that is, providing a numeric 
or other form of information on the degree 
to which the processes manifest effectiveness) 
is one of the major points of debate. It is fair 
to say that the  ‘ how to do it ’ knowledge is 
still at an embryonic stage. 
 For the defi nition of risk based targeting 
above to be true for the objective of pro-
ducing reliable fi nancial reporting with the 
SEC defi ned tolerance of zero material errors, 
companies would need to determine them-
selves, or be told by the SEC, or a source rec-
ognized by the SEC as legitimate, what areas 
of their fi nancial disclosures, and the fi nancial 
statements of others in their business sector, 
have historically shown the highest statis-
tical probability of being materially misstated 
and why. Information on which elements of 
public company fi nancial statements most 
frequently require restatements is available 
currently from only one credible source in 
the United States, a company called Audit 
Analytics. There is no reliable source for 
informa tion on the most statistically prob-
able root causes of restatements. Other coun-
tries, including Canada, the United Kingdom, 
Europe, and elsewhere do not currently have 
any reliable source that is statistically tracking 
and reporting details on material errors found 
in published fi nancial statements through 
restatements and the root causes of those 
misstatements. The absence of reliable infor-
mation on the statistical root causes of mis-
statements is, in itself, indicative of the lack 
of regulatory focus on determining the real 
risks that threaten the goal of reliable fi nancial 
reporting. 
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 The amount of disclosure companies and 
auditors must make when material errors 
in prior period disclosures are discovered is 
highly variable and generally limited. ( Note : 
The usefulness of information on restatements 
should improve substantially once all informa-
tion on restatements fi led by public companies 
are categorized using globally accepted XBRL 
taxonomy. This will allow the areas impacted 
by restatements to be electronically tagged. 
This in turn will open up opportunities to 
do statistical analysis at a company level, busi-
ness sector level, national level and international 
level on the statistically most probable areas 
of auditor-certifi ed unreliable disclosures.) 
Historical information on the most likely areas 
of material error in a company ’ s disclosures 
and the root cause(s) of those errors / irregularities 
would have to be supplemented by efforts to 
identify new emerging risk areas that could 
produce  ‘ potential adverse impact ’ in the future 
(for example, the stock option backdating 
scandals, or the problems at the heart of the 
2008 global crisis including collateral-backed 
securities and others). Identifying what is gene-
rally referred to as  ‘ emerging risks ’ requires 
drawing on risk management processes recom-
mended by organizations like the  Bank for 
International Settlements , more commonly 
referred to as BIS, to identify emerging risks, 
including risks in new products, services, sys-
tems and other areas (2010, p. 10). 
 The Institute of Management Accountants 
( ‘ IMA ’ ) in the United States produced what 
is arguably the most complete description 
of what a true risk-based approach would 
look like in their discussion paper  ‘ A Global 
Perspective on Assessing Internal Control 
over Financial Reporting ’ issued in September 
2006. ( Confl ict disclosure : One of the authors 
of this article is the primary author of the 
IMA paper.) This paper was fi led with and 
presented to the SEC but not accepted at the 
time as a valid approach for SOX 404 assess-
ments. The IMA paper, unlike PCAOB AS2, 
notes techniques to build a reasonable list of 
risks for fi nancial reporting and provides details 
on how to identify relevant risks, including 
use of research and observation, company-
specifi c history, experience of senior level 
staff, industry-specifi c scenario analysis, risk 
source analysis and industry checklists. 
 A sample of macro-level risks at the root of 
some of the most signifi cant accounting misstate-
ments in history, based on the author ’ s experi-
ence and research, includes the following: 
 1.  CEO and CFO have signifi cant fi nancial 
incentives to falsify and / or inappropriately 
manage fi nancial results. 
 2.  Senior management has major fi nancial 
incentives to direct backdating of stock 
options. 
 3.  Senior management directs improper /
 fraudulent post-close journal entries to 
manage profi ts and / or hit earning targets 
disclosed to the market. 
 4.  Management overrides controls to hit 
bonus targets or prevent loss of positions. 
 5.  Audit committees have fi nancial incentives 
not to ask management tough questions. 
 6.  Accounting staff are not current on 
accounting standards. 
 7.  Management lacks the appropriate know-
ledge and skills to deal with accounting for 
complex or signifi cant judgment-related 
transactions. 
 8.  In-house accounting personnel lack the 
necessary training and experience to deal 
with the scope of the organization ’ s opera-
tions. 
 9.  The external audit team ’ s objectivity is 
compromised by confl icts of interest. 
 10.  External audit team lacks appropriate 
know ledge / skills, and / or the courage to 
challenge management ’ s assumptions. 
 With some modest research funding (modest 
in comparison to cost of failure), this illus-
trative list could be refi ned and list in order 
of frequency / consequence the most signifi -
cant risks that have been at the root of major 
fi nancial misstatements of US listed public 
companies over the past 20 years. One of the 
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few attempts to date to empirically examine 
this area was published in 2008 by  Marlene 
Plumlee and Teri Lombardi Yohn ,  An Analysis 
of the Underlying Causes of Restatements . Unfor-
tunately, other than the Plumlee and Yohn 
paper, very little empirical research on the 
topic exists today. This is likely true because of 
the political sensitivity of completing analysis 
on auditing failure given the funding audit 
fi rms provide and the fact that there are sig-
nifi cant barriers to completing that research, 
most notably litigation risk to companies and 
external auditing fi rms that would have to 
cooperate. These barriers would need to be 
addressed by SEC endorsement and regulatory 
support and suffi cient funding. 
 Following the issuance of the IMA discus-
sion papers on attributes of a true risk-based 
approach to SOX 404, a formal request was 
made to the SEC by the one of the authors of 
this article to modify their SOX 404 guidance to 
allow the use of ISO 31000, a generally accepted 
risk assessment framework ( Leech, 2010 ). Argu-
ably, ISO 31000 is better equipped to meet the 
SEC defi ned  ‘ suitability ’ criteria than the three 
control frameworks currently sanctioned by the 
SEC. (COSO, 1992; Cadbury / Turnbull, 1994; 
and CoCo, 1995 ) The SEC ’ s response at the 
time was they were only prepared to offer a 
response if a request to use ISO 31000 as a  ‘ suit-
able ’ framework for SOX 404 assessments was 
made by a registrant via their pre-ruling process. 
( Note : The SEC has refused requests from one 
of the authors of this article to produce the evi-
dence they have relied on when they concluded 
in 2004 that COSO 92, CoCo 95 and Turnbull 
94 met their stated suitability criteria). 
 WHAT US CONGRESS, THE 
SEC AND PCAOB NEED TO 
DO TO PREVENT THE NEXT 
MAJOR WAVE OF UNRELIABLE 
FINANCIAL REPORTING 
 To improve the reliability of fi nancial reports, 
including the external audit opinions that 
accompany them, this article proposes three 
relatively simple steps. 
 1.  Congress makes a simple amendment to Sec-
tion 404 of the Sarbanes – Oxley Act of 2002. 
 To implement a true risk-based approach 
capable of reducing the number and 
magni tude of material errors in fi nancial 
statements, we recommend SOX 404 
be amended as follows:   
 SEC. 404. MANAGEMENT ASSESS-
MENT OF FINANCIAL REPORTING 
RISK MANAGEMENT PROCESSES. 
 (a)  RULES REQUIRED.  – The Commis-
sion shall prescribe rules requiring each 
annual report required by Section 13(a) 
or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act 
of 1934 (15 USC 78m or 78o(d)) to 
contain risk management effectiveness 
report, which shall  – 
 (1)  state the responsibility of manage-
ment for establishing and maintaining 
adequate risk management processes 
for fi nancial reporting; and 
 (2)  contain an assessment, as of the end 
of the most recent fi scal year of the 
issuer, of the effectiveness of the 
risk management processes of the 
issuer for fi nancial reporting. 
 (b)  RISK MANAGEMENT PROCE SSSES 
EVALUATION AND REPORTING.  – 
With respect to the risk management 
processes assessment required by sub-
section (a), each registered public account-
ing fi rm that prepares or issues the audit 
report for the issuer shall attest to, and 
report on, the assessment made by the 
management of the issuer. An attesta-
tion made under this subsection shall be 
made in accordance with standards 
for attestation engagements issued or 
adopted by the Board. Any such attesta-
tion shall not be the subject of a separate 
engagement. 
 2.  The SEC issues new guidance on how to 
assess the effectiveness of the risk manage-
ment processes that support the objective 
of materially fault-free fi nancial reporting. 
 The SEC would need to amend its current 
guidance for management and describe how 
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to evaluate the effectiveness of a company ’ s 
risk management systems that support the 
core objective of issuing materially fault-
free fi nancial disclosures. This would need 
to include methods that are accepted by 
the global risk management community. 
This guidance would need to require, at a 
minimum, that the risks that statistically have 
been at the root of materially wrong fi nancial 
statements over the past 50 years be identifi ed 
and assessed, as well as statisti cally probable 
risks, including emerging risks, relevant to 
a company ’ s specifi c business sector and per-
sonal accounting restatement history. Once a 
list of statistically material risks is produced, 
management would need to, as a minimum, 
evaluate the likely effectiveness of the current 
 ‘ risk treatments ’ (a term similar to  ‘ control ’ 
that is preferred by ISO 31000) in place to 
mitigate the statistically most dangerous risks 
to reliable fi nancial disclosures. Any SOX 404 
work done to date that can be linked to the 
most stati stically probable / high-consequence 
risks to the goal of materially fault-free fi nan-
cial reporting would still be relevant.  
 The changes necessary to convert from the 
current costly  ‘ control-centric ’ approach 
to one that uses globally accepted risk 
management principles has been out-
lined in more detail in two IMA discus-
sion papers:  Accounting Control Assessment 
Standards: The Missing Piece in the Restate-
ment Puzzle and A Global Perspective on 
Assessing Control Over Financial Reporting . 
 The SEC could also draw on guidance 
issued in December 2010 by the Institute 
of Internal Auditors titled  Assessing the Ade-
quacy of Risk Management Using ISO 31000 . 
 To date, the SEC has refused written 
requests to formally recognize risk man-
agement approaches and standards identi-
fi ed in frameworks such as ISO 31000 and 
the more dated and lengthy 2004 COSO 
ERM as  ‘ suitable ’ frameworks for SOX 404 
assessments. 
 3.  The PCAOB issues new guidance for 
external auditors on how to assess and 
opine on the effectiveness of a compa-
ny ’ s risk management processes.   
 Once the SEC has issued suffi ciently 
detailed guidance for management on how 
to complete their assessment of the effec-
tiveness of their risk management processes 
that support the goal of reliable fi nancial 
disclosures, auditors should be able to use 
the same criteria to independently opine on 
the effectiveness of the company ’ s risk 
management processes supplemented by 
guidance on how to assess and report on 
the effectiveness of management ’ s risk mana-
gement processes. 
 THE BUSINESS CASE FOR 
MOVING TO A TRUE  ‘ RISK-
BASED ’ SOX 404 APPROACH 
 The three steps proposed above to transition 
from the current control-centric approach to 
a true risk-based approach would be relatively 
inexpensive to implement by legislators. There 
would, however, need to be signifi cant changes 
to the current SOX 404 and Canadian equi-
valent NI 52-109 assessments being done today 
by over 24  000 US and Canadian listed com-
panies ( Directory of Public Companies in the 
United States ). This would entail some initial 
short-term incremental implementation costs 
to determine and address the statistically pro-
bable root causes of material errors and irregu-
larities. The approach used by tens of thousands 
of external auditors and tens of thousands of 
internal SOX 404 assessment staff around the 
world would also have to change. 
 Reliable information on the root causes of 
materially wrong fi nancial statements would 
need to be kept and analyzed and used to 
better identify, measure and track risks to reli-
able reporting, ideally linked to XBRL tags 
to allow for sophisticated computer analysis. 
The real risks to the objective of materially 
reliable fi nancial statements would need to 
be identifi ed, including sensitive risks, such 
as  ‘ CEO and CFO collude and manipulate 
earnings ’ ,  ‘ CFO / Controller isn ’ t technically 
current ’ ,  ‘ Accounting staff aren ’ t adequately 
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qualifi ed and / or trained ’ ,  ‘ external audit team 
lacks required experience and knowledge ’ , 
 ‘ external audit staff  ’ s objectivity has been 
compromised ’ , and the adequacy of the risk 
treatments in place re-evaluated. On the basis 
of informal polls taken by the authors of this 
article at scores of presentations around the 
world, evaluation of this type of hugely mate-
rial, but highly sensitive risks to reliable fi nan-
cial reporting does not occur in any serious 
documented way in the majority of publicly 
listed companies today. 
 Radical change is rarely easy to implement, 
and Congress may be reluctant to embark on 
this path in the absence of a persuasive business 
case. A list of critical reasons why US Con-
gress should take the bold step of amending 
the wording of SOX 404 follows: 
 REASON #1  – The current 
control-centric approach to SOX 
404 costs a lot and produces 
a high failure rate 
 To date, no country in the world other 
than the United States has accepted the cost /
 benefi t business case for SOX 404(b) that 
requires a separate external auditor opinion on 
 ‘ control effectiveness ’ . Only the United States 
has elected to require a separate auditor opinion 
on control effectiveness. In spite of the United 
States requiring two separate and very costly 
opinions on  ‘ control effectiveness ’  – one from 
a company ’ s CEO and CFO and the other 
from the company ’ s external auditor each 
year  – there is no empirical support that this 
costly approach produces any more reliable 
results than the assurance approach taken in 
countries such as Canada and the United 
Kingdom. Neither of these countries requires 
a separate opinion from the company ’ s 
external auditor that fi nancial reporting con-
trols are  ‘ effective ’ . Both emphatically rejected 
adopting the equivalent of SOX 404(b) based 
on cost / benefi t analysis done by regulators in 
those countries. In spite of companies being 
forced to spend tens of billions of dollars each 
year opining on control effectiveness, there is 
also no empirical research that the authors of 
this article are aware of the fact that demon-
strates that US listed fi nancial statements are 
statistically more reliable in the post-SOX 404 
world than they were before SOX 404 was 
enacted. 
 The truth is that there is clear evidence 
that thousands of US listed companies that 
have spent billions of dollars to implement 
the current control-centric approach to SOX 
404 have published materially wrong fi nan-
cial statements. Annual reports from the 
US-based Audit Analytics continue to con-
fi rm that, although the numbers of materi-
ally wrong fi nancial statements published by 
US listed fi nancial statements have decreased 
since peaking in post-SOX 2006, the total 
dollars of misstated balances each year con-
tinues to be a staggering number. If the 
balance sheets of the organizations at the 
root of the 2008 global fi nancial crisis that 
have been assessed by some as  ‘ technically 
correct, but massively wrong ’ are included 
in the misstatement total, it is literally an 
 ‘ earth-shaking ’ number. 
 REASON # 2  – The current control-
centric approach misses the really 
big risks 
 In the years leading up to the global fi nancial 
crisis of 2008, companies around the world 
accumulated trillions of dollars of assets whose 
value was directly linked to one key assump-
tion  – the US housing market would con-
tinue to rise indefi nitely.  Figure 2 , featuring 
an index of American housing prices going 
back to 1890, published by Yale economist 
Robert J. Shiller, provides a graphic illustra-
tion of why that assumption should have been 
regularly and aggressively questioned as a key 
risk by both management of the companies 
at the center of the global fi nancial crisis and 
their external auditors ( Tapscott and Tapscott, 
2008 ). 
 In addition to identifying risks to asset 
valua tions, including the risk of a correction, 
there should have also been formal analysis of 
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the  ‘ risk treatment ’ strategy in place in all 
companies impacted by that chart to manage 
the risk the trend line would not continue to rise 
forever. In cases where this risk was  ‘ fi nanced ’ 
or  ‘ transferred ’ , the ability of the counterparty 
to absorb the risk should have similarly been 
rigorously examined. The risk management 
processes related to the asset value assigned 
to these assets should have been rigorously 
examined and opinions provided to the board 
on the effectiveness of the risk management 
processes and the adequacy of the risk treat-
ments in place. No evidence has been produced 
that this step was done as part of the massively 
expensive SOX 404 control effectiveness assess-
ment process. 
 What is certain is that billions of dollars were 
spent during the run-up period of 2005 – 2008 
on internal and external staff testing con-
trols linked to line items of those companies ’ 
fi nancial statements that have never been, and 
are likely never to be, the source of material 
errors. By way of illustration, very few com-
panies or their external auditors identifi ed 
the reward systems in companies at the root of 
the global crisis as material risks to the reliabi-
lity of the fi nancial statements. Commissions 
have also identifi ed defi cient board oversight 
of risk as another major root cause. On the 
basis of research done by one of the authors 
of this article SOX 404 control effectiveness 
assessments have rarely, if ever, determined 
that any US listed company has a defi cient 
audit committee ( Leech and Gupta, 2004, 
p. 18 ). Major commissions in the United States 
and globally are unanimous that reward sys-
tems and defi cient risk oversight are two of 
the root causes of the fi nancial crisis. A true 
risk-centric approach that included the SEC 
stipulating the statistically most probable and 
signifi cant risks to reliable fi nancial reporting 
would have at least stood a chance of iden-
tifying this type of risk. History demonstrates 
that control-centric SOX 404 testing using 
the now dated COSO 92 control framework 
as criteria completely missed the mark. COSO 
92 puts very little emphasis on the impor-
tance of aligned reward systems or rigorous 
 Figure 2 :   A History of US home values.   
 Source :  Shiller (2006) , Figure 2.1.  
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board oversight of risk management processes 
including those used to ensure reliable fi nancial 
reporting. ( Note : COSO announced plans in 
late 2010 to update the 1992 COSO Internal 
Control Integrated Framework. However, it 
is important to note that the COSO chair 
stated  ‘ This project is not intended to change 
how internal control is defi ned, assessed, or 
mana ged, but rather provide more compre-
hensive and relevant conceptual guidance and 
practical examples ’ .) 
 REASON #3  – The current 
approach isn ’ t aligned with ERM 
methods 
 Companies that are working on implementing 
some form of enhanced ERM to better manage 
risks of all types currently face a signifi cant 
problem. The SOX 404 assessment approach 
required by the SEC and PCAOB is not aligned 
with generally accepted risk assessment methods 
and terminology. If a company uses enterprise 
risk management software, they must have one 
module for SOX 404 work and a separate 
system or module for other elements of ERM. 
This means that companies must implement 
a pure form of risk assessment approach across 
all of their operations using the type of approach 
in ISO 31000 or COSO ERM, except for the 
objective of publishing materially fault-free 
fi nancial statements. For that objective, they 
must use the type of methods prescribed by 
the SEC and PCAOB that their external audi-
tors will accept, including the use of the COSO 
1992 Internal Control Integrated Framework, 
which does not use modern risk management 
terminology. 
 The need to use separate terminology and 
approach creates yet another  ‘ silo ’  – the  ‘ SOX 
404 control effectiveness silo ’ . Silos are another 
one of the global crisis root causes identifi ed by 
major commissions. The SOX 404 silo today 
must use terminology and approaches that 
are inconsistent with those used to imple-
ment ERM in virtually all other areas of the 
company. In essence, work units must learn 
two different languages  – SOX 404 Control 
centric terminology, and another for ERM 
based on the type of terminology found in 
ISO 31000 and the related ISO Guide 73. 
This creates considerable additional expense 
and confusion. The SEC now requires proxy 
disclosures related to risk oversight, and boards 
will be asking management whether they 
believe risk management to be effective for 
all aspects of the company, except the goal 
of reliable fi nancial reporting. For that dimen-
sion the board receives management ’ s opinion 
on control effectiveness, not risk management 
effectiveness. 
 REASON #4  – Assure the world 
that the United States is taking 
tangible steps to ﬁ x one of the 
root causes of the global crisis 
 The general global consensus is that the roots of 
the global fi nancial crisis were planted and nur-
tured in the United States through a confl uence 
of factors, including political support for the 
creation and support of gigantic organizations 
such as Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae charged 
with making affordable housing; reward struc-
tures in the major US fi nancial institutions at the 
root of the crisis; defi cient regulatory oversight; 
accounting standards and auditing practices that 
allowed for accounting deception vehicles such 
as the now infamous REPO 105 transactions; 
defi cient capital requirements and regulatory 
oversight; and others. The dramatic decline of 
the US dollar relative to other major currencies 
around the world is evidence of a decrease in 
global confi dence in the US governance and 
political systems. 
 What has not yet been acknowledged, 
perhaps as a result of the enormous infl u-
ence of the major auditing fi rms, is the role 
the accounting and auditing frameworks, 
including the costly SOX 404 regime cur-
rently in place in the United States, played 
in the period leading up to the global fi nan-
cial crisis. If the United States is to regain 
its position as the most trusted economy in 
the world, dramatic steps need to be taken. 
One of those steps could be to acknowledge 
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that, in spite of imposing costs in the tens 
of billions of dollars on US listed companies 
all over the world through SOX 404 as a 
solution to unreliable fi nancial reporting a 
massively costly and arguably obsolete solu-
tion that has not worked very well in terms 
of assuring investors fi nancial statements are 
reliable. Recognizing this fact, US Congress, 
rather than attempting to continue to defend 
and maintain a costly regulatory regime that 
does not work very well, is taking dramatic 
steps and replacing the current control centric 
SOX 404 process with one that focuses on, 
and better treats, the truly material risks to 
the reliability of fi nancial disclosures. 
 SERIOUS POSITIVE CHANGE  – 
WHAT WILL IT TAKE? 
 At the current time, few people have raised 
the points made in this article about the link 
between a fl awed SOX 404 regime and the 
global fi nancial crisis, and few are objecting 
to the current SOX 404 regime for any rea-
sons other than cost and inconvenience. This 
article makes a case that the current control-
centric SOX 404 regime should be added 
to the list of root causes of the global crisis 
and steps taken to address it. This will take a 
concerted and joint effort by legislators, regu-
lators, public companies and the accounting 
and external audit professions starting with 
the willingness of US Congress to amend 
the wording of SOX 404. If US Congress is 
willing to make the legislative amendments 
proposed in this article, the authors believe 
it would be a monumental step towards pre-
venting another massive wave of unreliable 
fi nancial reporting. This article will be dis-
tributed to all the major US Congressional 
Committees and international committees 
studying what went wrong in the period 
leading up to the global fi nancial crisis, as well 
as the SEC, PCAOB and security regulators 
in other major countries. A small legislative 
change could make a massive difference in 
restoring global confi dence in US corporate 
governance and capital markets. 
 NOTES 
 1  ACAP-US Treasury Advisory Committee 
on the Auditing Profession. 
 2  Risk-Based Targeting: Allocation of funds 
and other resources to areas identifi ed as 
having the highest actual or potential 
adverse impact.  Source : Business Dictionary
.com,  http://www.businessdictionary.com/
defi nition/risk-based-targeting.html , accessed 
April 2011. 
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